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 Abstract-- This paper presents results of a task to analyze 
operating experience data to determine the combined ‘fail to 
operate on demand’ and ‘fail to continue to run’ failure rate for 
the toroidal field coil power supply at the DIII-D fusion facility.  
This large power supply is used in every plasma shot and has a 
considerable amount of operations data accumulated.  Studying 
power supply reliability supports safety assessment, machine 
availability assessment and can potentially improve power supply 
performance.  The DIII-D Trouble Report database was used to 
determine the number of power supply faults, system design 
descriptions supplied the power supply basic information, and 
operations data supplied the numbers of shots that have been 
performed.  The power supply fail to operate failure rate was 
found to be 1.1E-02/operations hour.  This reliability value 
compared well with the value from power supply data that has 
been analyzed from the Joint European Torus, and also 
compared very favorably with some particle accelerator power 
supply data.  
I. INTRODUCTION
he International Energy Agency (IEA) sponsors a 
collaboration on the environmental, safety and economic 
aspects of magnetic fusion, and one of the tasks within the 
collaboration is development of a fusion component failure 
rate database.  These data are to be used in quantifying 
probabilistic safety assessment, supporting traditional safety 
analysis, quantifying reliability availability maintainability 
inspectability analyses, and any other uses that field 
experience feedback can provide for fusion facilities.  The 
failure rate database task has two parts.  The first part of the 
task has been to collect or ‘harvest’ already-published data 
from high technology industries that can be readily applied to 
fusion components [1].  The second part of the task has been 
to collect and analyze operating experience data from existing 
tokamaks and other fusion experiments since many of these 
facilities have now accumulated significant time durations of 
operating experiences and documented these experiences to 
allow statistical data analysis.  The data harvesting task 
initially populated a computerized database that has been 
developed and is currently operated at ENEA-Frascati [2].  
The ongoing operating experience data analysis is providing 
further information to the database [3-6].   
For the fusion-specific data collection and analysis from 
operating machines, it is prudent to compare the results to an 
independent data set to prove that the data are representative 
of other machine operating experiences, despite the soundness 
of data recording, collection, and analysis.  By agreement  
among task participants, data values require some level of 
validation for entry into the database.  Generally this 
validation is by comparison of two independent data values; 
good data compare within a factor of 3, fair data within a 
factor of 10, and poor data compare at larger than a factor of 
10 [1].  Positive comparisons demonstrate that the values are 
actual rates and not the result of some site-specific issue.  
Developing a second, independent data set for validation 
comparison is difficult.  Task participants endeavor to develop 
data sets that are complimentary for the purpose of validation.  
The data presented here are the initial results of a task to 
generate an independent data set from DIII-D operating 
experiences to compare to similar work that has been 
completed on operating experiences from the JET Joint 
Undertaking [7].  
The large power supplies have been chosen for study since 
this type of component will be needed for the International 
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) and other future 
experiments.  While the power supplies for DIII-D’s resistive 
magnets are not similar to ITER superconducting magnet 
power supplies, the electrical energy delivered by DIII-D 
power supplies makes them relevant to other ITER uses and 
the magnet power supply operating experiences are valuable 
feedback for future experiments that require any type of large 
power supplies.  Large power supplies all tend to have fairly 
high currents and/or voltages and thus pose operational safety 
concerns; DIII-D personnel are excluded from the power 
supply areas during operations as a safety precaution.  Any 
faults in this high-energy equipment are important to 
understand for operational safety and machine availability.   
II. DIII-D OPERATING EXPERIENCE DATA ANALYSIS
 The DIII-D experiment has twenty-four toroidal field (TF) 
magnets.  Applying 127 kA to these water-cooled copper coils 
gives a maximum magnetic field of 2.2 T on axis.  There are 
four modules in the TF power supply, which is designated as 
the “B” power supply (PS).  Two modules are operated two 
and two in parallel and the two sets are in series; they are 
connected by interphase transformers and output busbars.  The 
modules are powered by 13.8 kVac, 525 MVA input power 
from one of the on-site motor-generator sets.  Each power 
supply module supplies 500 Vdc at 65 kA, producing a total 
output of 1000 Vdc at 130 kA.  All four modules combined 
weigh a total of 168 metric tons, and require air cooling to the 
transformers and water cooling to the rectifiers [8].   
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The B PS ramps up the TF coil current to a pre-programmed 
value for a given plasma shot over ~4.5 s before the plasma 
shot.  The four modules regulate the coil flattop current for up 
to 5 s, and overcome the resistive losses in the coil and 
buswork.  Then the PS ramps down over ~1 s [8].  The power 
supplies and magnet coils then cool down for ~10 minutes and 
can then be set to pulse again.  The modules use ‘hockey 
puck’ silicon controlled rectifiers (SCRs) for secondary 
rectification and output current control.  Each module has its 
own circuit breaker and is individually protected.  Each of the 
four TF PS modules has a separate control cabinet with 
interlocks and current regulation circuitry.   
The TF PS is used for each plasma operation while other 
power supplies dedicated to plasma heating may be idle, 
depending on the physics parameters needed for a given 
plasma shot.  Therefore, the total count of plasma shots give 
the operational demands of the TF magnet PS.  Table 1 gives 
the annual count of plasma shots and operating days.   
Table 1.  Annual Counts of DIII-D Plasma Shots 
Operating Year Number of Plasma Shots 
and Operating Days 
1987, May 19 to end of year 2,265 in 63 days from May 
1988 3,358 in 105 days 
1989 3,953 in 121 days 
1990 1,829 in 62 days 
1991 2,617 in 99 days 
1992 1,514 in 56 days 
1993 2,362 in 87 days 
1994 1,976 in 65 days 
1995 1,725 in 59 days 
1996 1,788 in 59 days 
1997 1,823 in 77 days 
1998 1,511 in 55 days 
1999 1,914 in 72 days 
2000 2,239 in 78 days 
2001 3,045 in 96 days 
2002 2,241 in 87 days 
2003 3,425 in 128 days 
2004 3,589 in 131 days 
Totals 43,174 in 1,500 days 
note: Operations are 0630 to 2200 hours, or 15.5-hour days 
The shots listed in Table 1 are actual plasma attempts.  Not 
every shot satisfies its engineering or physics parameters, but 
in all of these cited shots the B PS was demanded to operate.  
Operating days were counted to provide comparison to the 
data analysis results for the JET power supplies.   
Starting up after a long tokamak outage can pose a 
reliability concern for large power supplies.  Both particle  
accelerators and fusion experiments [9,10] have noted that the 
power supplies do not operate well for the day or two after an 
extended outage of a week or longer.  DIII-D data have not yet 
been analyzed at such a level of detail to affirm or refute this 
experience, but DIII-D staff routinely test the power supplies 
before machine restart to enhance PS reliability.  This testing 
usually requires two weeks during long outages due to the 
number of power supplies needed to operate the plasma 
confinement and heating systems. 
The DIII-D Trouble Report Database [11] was used to 
provide the B PS fault reports.  Between the database 
inception in May 1987 and the end of 2004, there were 275 
trouble reports (TRs) for the B PS.  These reports are too 
numerous to recreate in this paper.  The TRs are summarized 
in Table 2, listed by the affected subcomponents.   
Table 2.  DIII-D Trouble Report Counts from 1987 - 2004 
Component Number of TRs Downtime (h) 
SCRs 90 81.20 
Gate drive boards 22 46.00 
Circuit breakers 48 28.75 
Other 
components 
115 68.15 
Total 275 224.10 
 The reliability analysis work performed for the coil power 
supplies on the JET machine used two failure modes [7].  The 
first failure mode was ‘alarm/erratic alarm/fail to preset’ and 
the second failure mode was ‘fail to operate/spurious 
operation’.  The present work for DIII-D used different 
terminology but the failure modes are similar and align to 
allow comparison.  The DIII-D data showed few erratic alarms 
and only a few events of failure to preset the PS before a shot.  
The DIII-D data showed mainly power supply failure to 
operate (FTO), where the power supply had been prepared but 
did not begin to supply power to the magnet set, and failure to 
continue to run (FTCTR), where the power supply began to 
operate but did not operate for the entire pulse.  The data also 
showed a few events of PS improper operation, Where the PS 
operated but did not provide the requested power.  Improper 
operation failures were combined with FTCTR and FTO 
failures for comparison to the FTO/spurious operation portion 
of the JET data analysis results.  Table 3 gives the results of 
the data binning for DIII-D TRs. 
The data in Table 3 do not sum to equal the number count 
of PS TRs.  This is because some TRs describe failures that 
were not attributable to the PS itself, and some TRs cited 
either multiple events of the B PS not operating for several 
sequential plasma shots or described PS output troubles that 
occurred over several shots.  Table 4 gives the TF coil PS 
system failure rates and the JET coil PS values. 
Table 3.  DIII-D Trouble Report Data Analysis Results 
Component Failure Modes TR Count 
SCRs FTO 
FTCTR 
Improper Operation 
No Failure 
Fail to Preset 
Alarm 
Erratic Alarm 
68
22
0
1
0
0
0
Gate drive boards FTO 
FTCTR 
Improper Operation 
No Failure 
Fail to Preset 
Alarm 
Erratic Alarm 
9
7
4
2
1
0
0
Circuit breakers FTO 
FTCTR 
Improper Operation 
No Failure 
Fail to Preset 
Alarm 
Erratic Alarm 
38
4
0
3
2
0
1
Other 
components 
FTO 
FTCTR 
Improper Operation 
No Failure 
Fail to Preset 
Alarm 
Erratic Alarm 
29
54
16
19
3
2
8
III. DISCUSSION
 The collected DIII-D experiences dwelled on component 
failures that precluded operations rather than alarm conditions.  
That emphasis is expected because the motivating reason for 
the Trouble Report database is to convey information from the 
operations personnel to the maintenance personnel [11].  
Efficient communications allow the machine to be promptly 
repaired and thus increase its operational availability.  Some 
of the JET data originated from a similar trouble report system 
and some came from operations logbooks.  Thus, the logs 
gave a higher level of alarm reporting in the JET data.  The 
differences between data sets available for analysis is believed 
to be one reason for the rather wide (factor of ~50) 
discrepancy between the ‘alarm and fail to preset’ failure rates 
in Table 4.  The ‘FTO and spurious operation’ values for JET 
and DIII-D compared much more closely, within a factor of 3 
of each other.  One reason for the difference in the hardware 
failure rates could be that the JET power supplies are larger 
than the DIII-D power supplies.  A larger PS has more 
components that could fail, such as SCRs, and this may be the 
primary reason why the JET PS FTO failure rate is greater  
Table 4.  DIII-D and JET Coil PS Failure Rate Results 
Facility
and 
Failure
Mode 
System 
Failure
Count 
System 
Operating
Time 
(h) 
Average
Failure
Rate
(/h)
Upper
Bound 
Failure
Rate
(/h)
DIII-D 
Alarm and 
Fail to 
Preset 
17 23,250 7.3E-04 1.1E-03 
JET 
Alarm and 
Fail to 
Preset 
534 14,864 3.6E-02 3.9E-02 
DIII-D 
FTO and 
Spurious 
Operation 
251 23,250 1.1E-02 1.2E-02 
JET 
FTO and 
Spurious 
Operation 
456 14,864 3.1E-02 3.3E-02 
note: The 2σ or 95% upper bound failure rates for a normal distribution were 
calculated by using a factor of 2 on the standard error and summing. 
than the DIII-D failure rate.  Overall, FTO relates more 
directly to the PS hardware than the Alarm failure mode, and 
per the IEA data convention described earlier, the FTO 
comparison was very positive.  This close comparison 
suggests that these two data sets can be used to validate each 
other for hardware faults and that further analysis work is 
warranted. 
 PS operating experiences from particle accelerators show 
similar trends to the DIII-D and JET experiences.  The 
Advanced Photon Source PS’s had a four-year average FTO 
failure rate of 1E-02/h [10] for mature components, which is 
highly comparable to the data given in Table 4.  The DAΦNE
accelerator reported between 0.18 and 0.36 power supply 
faults per operating day with an average value of 0.32 [9], this 
rate is within the range of the DIII-D and JET experience.  
 The JET data overall showed that these power supplies are a 
challenge to operate.  There was an average of 1.2 troubles per 
operating day for the set of JET coil power supplies [7].  The 
DIII-D average was 0.18 troubles per operating day for the TF 
coil PS.  The variation between these TR rates is believed to 
be due to JET data including larger PS’s, more coil PS units, 
and more alarm data than the presently evaluated DIII-D TF 
PS data set.  While the DIII-D TR rate is only 15% of the JET 
value, the DIII-D rate still poses operational inconvenience. 
 The DIII-D data has also presented some qualitative safety 
information in the form of a small number of events of plant 
safety importance.  Out of the 275 TRs, there were two events 
of battery failures in the B PS uninterruptible power supplies.   
These events, in 1987 and 1989, involved failed batteries 
overheating, which resulted in smoke that actuated smoke 
detectors and also a limited amount of flames.  The staff 
responded and extinguished the fires.  A 1993 TR described a 
small amount of sparks issuing from the side of module 1 of 
the B PS during pulse shots; the module was cited for repair in 
the pending outage.  In another TR from 1998, an SCR in PS 
module 2 failed catastrophically, spewing hot debris that 
caused collateral damage to nearby components.  DIII-D has 
experienced dozens of SCR failures in the B PS, and there are 
more TRs that cite SCR failures in other power supplies.  In 
general, SCRs tend to fail benignly rather than by 
disassembling and scattering hot debris and ionized air.  While 
rare, SCR failures that lead to fire or disassembly are known 
to occur.  Melvold [12] presented data that an operational 
failure rate for power routing thyristor SCRs was 0.5% per 
plant year, averaged over 20 utilities for 14 years.  Few of 
those faults led to fires.  Further work on DIII-D PS data will 
be needed to confirm if tokamaks experience a similar failure 
rate.  A notable event occurred at DIII-D in 1998 – a staff 
member reported a foul smell emanating from the B PS.  
Investigation revealed it was merely an odor from nylon 
screws in the PS warming up; nonetheless, this event 
demonstrates the high level of attention the staff gives to 
tokamak operation.  Overall, the TRs serve to illustrate that 
the PS controls a large amount of electrical energy and that 
DIII-D’s safety measures to set up exclusion areas around 
these units during operations is prudent to protect personnel 
from rare SCR failure events and other electrical faults.  
Another qualitative observation from the data set is that some 
mechanical parts, notably circuit breakers, have definite useful 
lifetimes and repeated exercising leads to excessive wear and 
early failure; this has been noted in fusion and accelerators 
[13,14].  Despite the fact that DIII-D is approaching its 
twentieth anniversary, some PS components remain state-of-
the-art for the function they provide and some failures should 
be expected.  In addition, because of the high frequency of 
troubles, there is a fairly high amount of troubleshooting, 
maintenance, and parts replacement activity noted with this 
PS.  Proper electrical safety procedures must be followed to 
assure that the staff is protected from electrical injury.  DIII-D 
has had a good electrical and industrial safety record, as seen 
in its annual reports, and the practices [15] that result in these 
good operations must be carried forward to ITER. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
 This paper has presented an overall field experience failure 
rate for the TF coil PS at DIII-D.  The results for failure to 
operate compared well to the JET PS operating experience 
history, and there was very good agreement with published 
data from a particle accelerator as well.  Future work in this 
area of operating experience review feeding forward to future 
machines will include analysis of additional data on the other 
DIII-D power supply systems and individual components in 
those systems to complete the comparison with the data 
obtained from JET.  When further work has been completed, 
more detailed comparisons can be made to validate the data 
for inclusion into the IEA failure rate database.   
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